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Essential Issues 
Encouraging private investment in the EU is currently a primary goal of the European Commission. 
However, the effectiveness of public policies to stimulate private investment – such as a European 
Fund for Strategic Investments, which was recently proposed by the president of the European Com-
mission, Jean-Claude Juncker – may be undermined by poor conditions for private investment in 
individual member states. In particular, the tax systems may negatively impact private investment. 
A key metric used to evaluate the impact of taxation on investment is the cost of capital. The cost 
of capital is defined as the minimum pre-tax real rate of return on an investment, given a post-
tax real rate of return of an alternative capital market investment. In this policy brief, we address 
the following questions. First, how does the fiscal investment climate in Germany, in terms of the 
cost of capital, currently compare to that of other member states of the European Union? Second, 
how has the cost of capital changed over the past 15 years? And third, what would be the effect 
of currently debated tax policy measures (e.g. the re-introduction of reduced-balance deprecia-
tion) on the cost of capital in Germany? 
Key MessagesMeasured in terms of the cost of capital, the investment climate in Germany currently ranks 24th 
out of the 28 EU member states. However, this represents an improvement over the year 2000, 
when Germany ranked 27th. In fact, among the EU-28, Germany has seen the most significant de-
cline in the cost of capital between 2000 and 2014, from 7.7% to 6.5%. This decline is mainly at-
tributable to considerable reductions in the country’s corporate tax rate. The comprehensive cor-
porate tax reforms enacted in 2001 and 2008 thus appear to have succeeded in improving the 
investment climate in Germany. Nevertheless, in comparison to most other EU member states, the 
cost of capital in Germany is still quite high. In order to further improve the investment climate in 
Germany, the (temporary) re-introduction of reduced-balance tax depreciation for movable fixed 
assets is currently being discussed. However, our analysis indicates that this would only slightly 
decrease the cost of capital from 6.5% to 6.3%. When we additionally account for the personal 
taxation of individual investors, a different picture emerges: The overall cost of capital in Germany 
currently amounts to 6.0%, and could be reduced considerably by taxing dividends and capital 
gains at lower rates than interest income.
Research Question  
and Relevance
Methodology
To analyse the incentive effects of taxes on investment we use the methodology proposed by 
Devereux and Griffith. This approach is based on neoclassical investment theory and assumes 
that companies invest in capital as long as the (decreasing) marginal returns cover the marginal 
costs – that is, the cost of capital. The cost of capital is the minimum required pre-tax real rate of 
return from a hypothetical investment, given a post-tax real rate of return of an alternative capi-
tal market investment. The cost of capital is commonly used to analyse the effects of taxation on 
marginal investment decisions, such as on the scale of investment in a given country. If the cost 
of capital exceeds the real capital-market interest rate, which we assume to be 5%, this indicates 
that taxation exerts a negative effect on the volume of real investment. The model allows one to 
take into account the most relevant provisions of corporate tax systems in a systematic way, most 
notably the corporate income tax rate, depreciation allowances, local profit taxes, real estate taxes, 
and other non-profit taxes.
The Devereux & Griffith model assumes a forward-looking perspective in the sense that it models the 
tax burden as perceived by companies facing a hypothetical investment decision. As the hypothetical 
investment, the model considers a mix of five different kinds of assets and differentiates between 
three different methods of financing the investment.1 Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the model.2 
The analysis of the effects of taxation on investment decisions is based on the assumption that 
companies act in the interests of their shareholders in order to maximise their wealth. This requires 
taking into account personal taxes on dividends, capital gains, and on the return from an alterna-
tive investment in the capital market. This approach does, however, raise practical difficulties, as 
shareholders are likely to reside in different jurisdictions or may even be tax-exempt institutional 
investors. It is therefore unclear what the relevant personal tax system is. Thus, the central case 
examined in the following only accounts for corporate taxation. In a later step we additionally take 
into account taxation at the level of individual investors.
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Figure 1: Structure of the model
1 The following weights are applied: a uniform 20% for the different types of assets (industrial buildings, machinery, patents, inventory, finan-
cial assets); sources of finance: 55% retained earnings, 10% new equity, and 35% external debt. Additional model assumptions: real capital 
market interest rate: 5%, inflation rate: 2%, economic depreciation rates: 3.1% for buildings, 17.5% for machinery, 15.35% for patents, 0% 
for inventory and financial assets
2 For further details on how the cost of capital is calculated, see Devereux, M.P. and R. Griffith (1999), The taxation of discrete investment choices, 
IFS Working Paper Series, W98/16, London; Devereux, M.P. and R. Griffith (2003), Evaluating tax policy for location decisions, International Tax 
and Public Finance, vol. 10(2), pp. 107-126; Schreiber, U. et al. (2002), Measuring the Impact of Taxation on Investment and Financing Deci-
sions, Schmalenbach Business Review, vol. 54(1), pp. 2-23. For an overview of the economic model assumptions, see Spengel, C. et al. (2014), 
Effective Tax Levels using the Devereux/Griffith Methodology, Project for the EU Commission TAXUD/2013/CC/120, Final Report 2014, p. B-1.
Devereux and 
Griffith Approach
Research Results in Detail
Corporate level
In 2014 the cost of capital for real investment in Germany was 6.5%. The cost of capital thus ex-
ceeds the capital market interest rate, which we assume to be 5%, indicating that taxation ex-
erts a negative effect on the volume of real investment in Germany. As a consequence, Germany 
currently ranks 24th in the EU-28. The main reason for this poor ranking is Germany’s comparably 
high tax rate on corporate profits, which amounts to approximately 31% (corporate income tax 
plus the “solidarity surcharge” (Solidaritätszuschlag) and local profit taxes). By contrast, the av-
erage profit tax rate in the EU is 23.1%.3
Only the United Kingdom, Malta, Spain, and France currently have a higher cost of capital than Ger-
many. Comparatively high tax rates on corporate profits are also a main cause of high capital costs 
in these countries.4 The only exception here is the United Kingdom, where the real-estate tax burden 
is the highest in the EU, while corporate profit taxes in the UK are slightly below average, at 21%. 
Estonia and Bulgaria top the country ranking with cost of capital figures of 5.2% and 5.3%, respec-
tively. The low cost of capital in Estonia is mainly due to the fact that retained profits are not subject 
to corporate income tax; only distributed profits are taxed. Similarly, the low cost of capital in Bulgaria 
can mainly be attributed to the low corporate income tax rate of 10%, which is the lowest among all 
EU member states. In general, the countries that have joined the European Union since 2005 (the 
“accession countries” or “EU-13” in what follows) have a lower cost of capital than the old EU mem-
ber states (5.7% versus 6.2% on average). 
Our analysis highlights the fact that the corporate income tax rate is the main driver of the cost of 
capital in EU member states. Though the rules governing the corporate income tax base are also of 
relevance, as illustrated by the examples of Belgium, Croatia, and Italy, which rank third to fifth, all 
with a cost of capital of 5.4%. In Belgium and Italy corporations may deduct notional interest expenses 
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Figure 2: Cost of capital (%) ranking of the EU member states (corporate level only), year 2014
3 For an overview of the corporate income tax rates and the overall profits taxes rates (including additionally surcharges and local profit tax rates), 
see Spengel et al. (2014), pp. A-1 et seq., table A-1.
4   Malta: 35%, Spain: 35.25%, France: 38.93%. In addition to the corporate income tax rate this includes surcharges levied on top of the corpo-
rate income tax and other profit taxes. See Spengel et al. (2014), pp. A-1 et seq., table A-1.
Current Cost of  
Capital Ranking of  
EU Member States
for equity capital from their corporate income tax base. This so-called “allowance for corporate eq-
uity” offsets the comparably high profit tax rates levied in these two countries (33.99% and 30.9% 
respectively).5 In turn, Croatia offers comparably generous tax depreciation allowances for buildings, 
machinery and patents, in addition to a slightly below-average profit tax rate of 20%.6
In the EU the average cost of capital declined from 6.3% in 2000 to 6.0% in 2014.7 As illustrated by 
Figure 3, in the old EU member states (EU-15), the average cost of capital declined to the same ex-
tent as in the accession countries (EU-13), though from a higher level. In Germany, the fall has been 
particularly pronounced, as the cost of capital declined from 7.7% in 2000 to 6.5% in 2014 – the 
sharpest reduction among all 28 EU member states. This decline is mainly attributable to the signifi-
cant reduction in the corporate income tax rate, which was reduced from 40% for retained profits and 
30% for distributed profits to a uniform 15% by 2014. Decreasing corporate income tax rates have 
also been the main driver of cost of capital declines in the other EU member states. Since 2000 the 
average corporate income tax rate in the EU-28 declined from 29.4% to 21.4%. In a small group of 
countries – France, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania , and Slovenia – the cost of capital was slightly higher in 
2014 compared to 2000. Croatia was the only country with a significant increase in the cost of capi-
tal, from 4.2% in 2000 to 5.4% in 2014. This increase was caused by the elimination of an allowance 
for corporate equity in 2001 which had been in place since 1994. 
How to design tax systems in order to eliminate, or at least mitigate, tax-induced distortions to 
the scale of investment, is a key concern in tax research. The exemption of retained profits from 
corporate income tax in Estonia constitutes one example of a corporate income tax that is neu-
tral with respect to the volume of investment. An alternative approach is to allow corporations to 
deduct notional interest expenses for equity capital from the corporate income tax base (“allow-
ance for corporate equity”), as is the case in Belgium and Italy. This ensures that corporate income 
tax does not negatively affect investment volumes if the notional interest rate equals the capital 
market interest rate. By contrast, a reduction in the corporate tax rate or an increase in the rate 
for tax depreciation may mitigate, but not fully eliminate, tax-induced distortions to the scale of 
investment. This has, however, been the preferred strategy for improving the fiscal investment 
climate among the EU member states in the past 15 years. 
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Figure 3: Development of the cost of capital (%) between 2000 and 2014 (corporate level only)
Development of  
Cost of Capital,  
2000-2014
Tax Policy 
Considerations
5 For details, see Spengel et al. (2014), pp. A-4 et seq., footnotes 1 and 23 to table A-1.
6  Industrial buildings may be depreciated on a straight-line basis over 10 years; machinery and patents may be depreciated on a straight-line 
basis over just 2 years. See Spengel et al. (2014), p. A-16, table A-6, p. A-18, table A-7, p. A-21, table A-8.
7 Table 1 on page 7 reports the cost of capital in the individual EU member states for 2000 to 2014.
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In Germany, a temporary re-introduction of reduced-balance depreciation at a multiple of the 
straight-line rate is currently being discussed. However, the lower the interest rate, the smaller 
the effect of the depreciation allowances on the cost of capital. Given the current low interest 
rates, the re-introduction of reduced-balance depreciation might not be as efficacious as envis-
aged by certain proponents of the measure. Indeed, the re-introduction of reduced-balance de-
preciation in Germany at three-times the straight-line rate (at the maximum 30%) for movable 
fixed assets would only slightly reduce the cost of capital from 6.5% to 6.3%, assuming a real 
interest rate of 5%.
Overall level
In the following, we additionally take into account shareholder taxation – namely, personal taxes 
on dividends, capital gains, and interest income. Figure 4 shows the cost of capital ranking of the 
EU member states on the corporate and the overall level. The investor is assumed to hold a sub-
stantial participation8 and is subject to the maximum personal income tax rate (if the country has 
a progressive personal income tax).
Figure 4 shows that in most countries, the overall cost of capital is lower than the cost of capital 
when just the corporate level is considered. This is due to the following effect: When taking into 
account shareholder taxation in addition to corporate taxation, this involves that the taxation of 
the return of the alternative investment (the capital market investment) is accounted for. Recall 
that the cost of capital is the minimum required pre-tax real rate of return required by the investor 
given a post-tax real rate of return from the alternative capital market investment. The tax rate ap-
plied to the capital market return negatively affects the cost of capital. Put differently, the higher 
the tax rate applied to the capital market return is, the lower is the cost of capital.
As shown by Figure 4, in some countries, the cost of capital at the overall level falls below the cap-
ital market interest rate of 5%. This indicates that compared to capital market investments, real 
investments are favoured by the tax system; the tax system thus generates positive incentives for 
real investment.
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Figure 4: Cost of capital (%) ranking of the EU member states  
(corporate and overall level), year 2014
8 In most countries, a uniform tax rate applies irrespective of the holding quota. In a few countries, tax payers that hold a participation exceeding 
a certain minimum holding quota (e.g. 25%) are taxed differently than portfolio investors. We consider the case of a substantial participation 
as the tax treatment of such an investor would most likely be considered by companies when taking investment decisions.
Current Overall Cost  
of Capital Ranking of  
EU Member States
Most notably, in the case of Cyprus, the return from the alternative capital market investment (inter-
est income) is taxed at higher rates than the returns from the real investment (dividends and capi-
tal gains), resulting in a cost of capital below the capital market interest rate. As a consequence, 
Cyprus jumps eleven places in the ranking and leads the country ranking when the overall cost of 
capital is considered. For the same reasons, France and the United Kingdom considerably improve 
their rankings, moving from place 28 and 25 to 12 and 6, respectively.
If, by contrast, interest income is taxed at a lower rate than dividends and capital gains, the overall 
cost of capital is generally higher than the cost of capital on the corporate level. This is the case, for 
example, in Estonia. As a consequence, Estonia falls considerably in the ranking, from the first to 
18th place. In Germany, the cost of capital on the overall level currently amounts to 6.0% and is thus 
lower than when solely accounting for corporate taxation (6.5%). Nevertheless, Germany’s position 
among its fellow member states is hardly affected (23rd instead of 24th place).
Whilst on the corporate level the cost of capital has declined more or less steadily over the past 15 years, 
the situation is not as clear cut when it comes to the cost of capital at the overall level. Figure 5 shows 
that on the overall level, the average cost of capital in the accession countries (EU-13) and average 
cost of capital in the old EU member states (EU-15), has developed in opposite directions. 
Table 1 on page 7 illustrates the cost of capital in the individual EU member states for 2000 to 2014. 
In Germany, the cost of capital first declined considerably from 5.9% in 2000 to 4.4% in 2001 due 
to the replacement of the imputation system with a partial exemption of dividends and capital gains 
within the scope of a comprehensive tax reform. Interest income, however, remained fully subject 
to the progressive income tax schedule. In 2009, the cost of capital increased again to its level in 
2000 as a consequence of the introduction of a uniform final withholding tax for capital income at 
a rate of 25% (“Abgeltungsteuer”).
A key approach to minimize tax-induced distortions of investment decisions is to ensure that the 
overall tax burden on the return from real investments (i.e. corporate and personal taxation) equals 
the tax burden on the return from alternative capital market investments. Under a flat tax system 
this may be achieved, for example, by exempting dividends and capital gains from personal income 
tax and taxing interest income at the same rate as corporate profits. 
Thus, in order to reduce negative incentives of taxation on real investment (as opposed to capital 
market investments) in Germany, one approach would be to exempt dividends and capital gains 
from the final withholding tax (“Abgeltungsteuer”) and to raise the rate of the final withholding tax 
to the rate applicable to corporate profits (i.e. the combined tax rate comprising of the corporate 
income tax, solidarity surcharge, and local business taxes). Assuming that the overall tax rate on 
6 | ZEWpolicybrief ZEWpolicybrief | 3 policy brief ZEW policy 7
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Figure 5: Development of the cost of capital (%) between 2000 and 2014 (overall level)
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corporate profits amounts to 30.95%,9 this would be associated with a cost of capital of 4.5%. In 
this case, the cost of capital falls below the capital market interest rate because of the rules gov-
erning tax depreciation and the valuation of inventory. In turn, a 50% exemption on dividends and 
capital gains from a final withholding tax levied at a rate of 30.95% would be associated with cost 
of capital just slightly above the capital market interest rate (5.1%).
9 This is based on the assumption that the multiplier for the local profit tax (“Gewerbesteuer”) is 432%.
